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Abstract 
In this paper there are presented algorithms for multilevel hierarchical threshold secret sharing 
schemes based on the interpolation of Hermite type, which use either traditional Shamir’s keys or 
polynomial and orthogonal polynomial keys. These algorithms enable to compute the probability 
of authenticity of shares during the process of recovering the keys. In addition, two models of 
secret sharing are considered, which enlarge their security against attacks and decrease their rate of 
computations by applying FFT-algorithm.  
 
1. Introduction 
The first secret sharing schemes were introduced by Shamir [1] and Balkley 
[2]. Several other models of secret sharing and their characteristic properties 
were studied in recent papers e.g. [3-6], and monographs [7-9]. In Shamir’s 
scheme the shares of the secret key  
 (0) mK w a= =   
have the form  
 0 0 1 1( , ),( , ),..., ( , )n nx y x y x y , 
where knots 0 1, ,..., nx x x  are pairwise disjoint nonzero points of a field F, 
( )i iy w x=  and  
 10 1( ) ... ,
m m
mw x a x a x a m n
−= + + + ≤  
is a polynomial, which is randomly chosen by a dealer. In order to recover the 
key K, the Lagrange interpolation formula based on any 1r + , m r n≤ ≤  shares  
has been always proposed [1,7-9].  
In this paper, we present hierarchical multilevel models of secret sharing 
based on the Hermite type interpolating polynomials p of degree less or equal to 
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r. In the very particular case r n= , these polynomials are uniquely determined 
by the following conditions 
 
( ) ( ) , 0,1,...,
!
ik
i
i
i
p x y i n
k
= = , 
where values ( ) ( ) / !iki i iy w y k=  can be easily computed by the extended Horner 
algorithm, and 
 { }: , 1i i k ik card k x x k−= = ≥ . 
Recovering of the key K requires now using either the Newton interpolating 
formula or the Neville recurrent interpolating formula, which have several 
additional features in comparison with the Lagrange type interpolating formula, 
even in the case of pairwise disjoint knots considered by A. Shamir. The 
corresponding theory and algorithms, written in the ISO/ANSI standard C++ 
[10], are given in Sections 1, 2, 3 and 4. It should be noted that all our 
algorithms are modeled in such a way that they are as simple, short and concise 
as possible.  
In particular, in Section 3 we establish a new model of multilevel secret 
sharing, which admits receiving c shares by the combiner and remaining 
1r c− +  shares by the participants of secret sharing. This enables to keep the 
number 1r c− +  of participants being small in comparison to degree m of the 
polynomial ( )w x  and to take a sufficiently large number c in order to increase 
simultaneously the degree m and the probability  
 [ ]
11
( ) 1
aut r mP card F −
= − −  
of the authorization of 1r +  shares, where ( )card F  denotes the number of 
elements of a finite field F.  
A further generalization of secret sharing models is established in Section 5. 
More precisely, instead of Shamir’s key mK a=  there is used the polynomial 
key of the form 
 
0 1 0 1
... , 0 ...
si i i s
K a a a i i i m= ≤ ≤ ≤ ≤ ≤  
where 
0 1
, ,...,
si i i
a a a  include all nonzero coefficients of polynomial ( )w x . This 
suggests that a general model of secret sharing of Shamir type can be described 
as follows: 
– A dealer chooses polynomial key 
0 1
...
si i i
K a a a= , which consists of all 
nonzero coefficients of the expansion  
 
0
( ) ( )
m
k k
k
w x a p x
=
= ∑ , 
 with respect to a base 0 1( ), ( ),.., ( )mp x p x p x  of all polynomials Pm of 
degree not greater than m. 
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– The dealer uses Algorithm A to compute shares 0 1, ,..., mb b b , which are 
identical to the coefficients of the expansion  
 
0
( ) ( )
m
k k
k
w x b g x
=
= ∑  
 with respect to another base 0 1( ), ( ),.., ( )mg x g x g x  of Pm. 
– A combiner gathers these shares and uses Algorithm B, inverse to 
Algorithm A, in order to recover the polynomial key 
0 1
...
si i i
K a a a= .   
In Section 6, this general threshold secret sharing model is used in the 
particular case when 0 1( ), ( ),.., ( )mp x p x p x  is a base of arbitrary monic 
orthogonal polynomials and 0 1( ), ( ),.., ( )mg x g x g x  is the Newton base which 
occurs in the extended Newton interpolation formula. In this case, the 
corresponding Algorithms A and B are extended Clenshaw and inverse 
Clenshaw algorithms. Finally, in Section 7 we discuss the usefulness of the 
famous FFT algorithm in the threshold secret sharing schemes for finite rings 
with primitive roots of unity. 
 
2. Hierarchy in secret sharing schemes 
Let ( ), ,F F= + ⋅  be a finite, or an infinite field, and let n be a positive integer 
such that 1n card(F)< − . Additionally, let the knots of interpolation 
{ }\ 0ix F∈ , 0,1,..,i n= , satisfy the following condition 
 ( )10 ...i j i i ji j n x x x x x+≤ < ≤∀ = ⇒ = = =  (1) 
and let the values ( 0,1,..., )iy F i n∈ =  be prescribed. Then a modified 
interpolating Newton formula of the form 
 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 1( ) , ( ) ... , ,..., ( )( )...( )n np x y y y x x y y y x x x x x x −= + − + + − − −  (2)  
defines a unique interpolating polynomial of Hermite type, i.e. a unique 
polynomial of degree less or equal to n, which satisfies the interpolating 
conditions  
 
( ) ( ) , 0,1,...,
!
ik
i
i
i
p x y i n
k
= = , (3) 
where 
 { }max :i i k ik k x x−= = , (4) 
is a left-hand side multiplicity of the knot xi. In this Newton formula, the 
symbols 
 0 1, ,..., ,    0,1,...,jy y y j n= , 
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denote modified divided differences with respect to the knots 0 1, ,.... nx x x , which 
are defined by the following recurrent formulae 1 1 2 1
,
, ,..., , ,..., , ,...
ii k k
i i i k i i i k i i
i k i
y
y y y y y y y y
x x
+ −
+ + + + + +
+
⎧⎪= −⎨⎪ −⎩
where 0 ,i i k n≤ + ≤ . Let us note that the number of occurrences of a knot xi 
among 0 1, ,.... nx x x , i.e. the multiplicity of the knot ix  is equal to 
 { }max 1:i i k i pn k p x x− += + + = . 
Clearly, we always have i in k>  and 1i sn k= +  for some s i≥ . 
Note that such an interpolating polynomial exists and is unique. This follows 
from the fact that interpolating conditions (3) yield a linear system of 1n +  
equations with 1n +  unknowns, which has the matrix of extended Vandermonde 
type. One can prove that its determinant [11] is equal either to 1, or to  
 
( , )
( )i j
i j
x x
∈Λ
−∏  
in the case when  
 ( ){ }:= , : 0 ,  i ji j j i n x xΛ ≤ < ≤ ≠ ≠ ∅ . 
Therefore, it is distinct from zero in the field F. This finishes the proof of 
existence and uniqueness of the polynomial of Hermite type. It should be noticed 
that the choice of interpolating conditions (3), instead of the usual interpolating 
Hermite conditions of the form 
 ( ) ( ) , 0,1,...,ik i ip x y i n= = , 
enables to diminish the computational complexity of the first two algorithms 
presented below. More precisely, it enables to omit the multiplications and 
divisions by !( )ij j k≤  in these algorithms. 
Now we can introduce a hierarchicalsecret sharing scheme with a random key 
K F∈ . In this model the dealer D chooses randomly knots 0 1, ,..., nx x x  from the 
set \ {0}F , and uses the extended Horner algorithm to compute the values 
 
( ) ( ) , 0,1,..,
!
ik
i
i
i
w xy i n
k
= = , (6) 
where 
 
0
( ) ,    
m m k
k
k
w x a x m n−
=
= ≤∑  (7) 
is a polynomial of degree m with randomly chosen coefficients 0 1 1, ,..., ma a a − , 
ma F∈  such that ma K= . Next, the dealer D distributes the keyK among 1n +  
participants of the secret sharing. More precisely, he gives them shares of the 
form 
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 ( , , ),    0,1,..,i i i iU k x y i n= = , 
where it is assumed that the multiplicities ni of knots xi satisfy the following 
restrictions 
 1in m≤ + , 
which guarantee that all shares are essential In order to do it, the dealer 
computes values 
 [ ] :   (i 0,1,…,n)iy i y= =  
by applying Algorithm 1.  
 
void Horner(FType w[], int m, FType x[], int n, FType 
y[]) 
{ 
   FType * b = new FType [m+1]; 
   int i = 0, mi;  
   FType xi; 
   while(i<=n) 
   { 
       for(int j=0; j<=m; j++) 
           b[j]= w[j]; 
       mi=m; xi=x[i]; 
       while(i<=n && x[i]==xi) 
       { 
           for(int j=1; j<=mi; j++) 
               b[j]= b[j-1]*xi+b[j]; 
           y[i]= b[mi]; 
           i++; mi--; 
       } 
   } 
} 
Algorithm 1. The function Horner 
 
We note that the class type FType should contain not only elements of the field 
F but also operations of addition, multiplication and inversion in F,which have 
to be denoted in the traditional way. In particular, all numerical examples 
presented in our paper use the library NTL [12], which contains classes 
connected with the field Zp of integers modulo a prime p.  
One can also consider the model of secret sharing with priorities, which 
require the following shares  
 ( )( 1)(0) (1), , ,..., ,    0,1,...,sini i i i iU x y y y i−= =  (8) 
where it is assumed additionally that i jx x≠  for i j≠ and 
Pobrane z czasopisma Annales AI- Informatica http://ai.annales.umcs.pl
Data: 04/08/2020 21:51:40
UM
CS
Ryszard Smarzewski, Joanna Kapusta 70
 
( )
( )
0
( ): ,    
!
js
j i
j i
j
w xn n m y
j=
= ≥ =∑ . 
It is clear that Algorithm 1 can be also applied to compute the coordinates 
 ( 1)(0) (1), ,..., ini i iy y y
−  
in this new case. Moreover, we note that the last model is not democratic, except 
the case when  
 0 1 ... sn n n= = = . 
 
2. Newton method of recovering the secret 
In order to recover the key (0)K w= , the combiner C  must receive 1r +  
shares  
 ( ), , ,     0,1,..., rj jj ji i i iU k x y j= = , (9) 
where m r n≤ ≤  and 0 10 ... ri i i n≤ < < < ≤ . Moreover, these shares must satisfy 
the conditions typical of the Hermite interpolation, which were presented in the 
previous section. More precisely, we should 
0
0ik = , and 
 1 21, 2,..., jjj j j j j k j ii
i i i i i i k− − −= − = − = − ,(10) 
whenever 0
ji
k > . Thus our model of secret sharing is hierarchical. In other 
words, this means that each holder of the share ( ), ,j jj ji i i iU k x y= , 0j > , can 
take part in recovering the secret only, if his superiors, which have the shares  
 1 2, ,...,j j j i ji i i kU U U− − − , 
do the same thing. 
Without the loss of generality, one can suppose that indices 0 1, ,..., ri i i  are 
equal to those 0,1,...,r , respectively. Then, in order to recover the key 
( )0K w= , it is necessary to compute first the modified divided differences 
 [ ] 0 1, ,..., ,    0,1,...,kz k y y y k r= = , 
defined by recurrent formula (5). It is obvious that  
 [ ] 0,    1,    2,..,z k k m m r= = + + . 
These identities can be applied to verify, whether shares 0 1, ,..., rU U U  are not 
falsified, i.e. whether there is not any share with the third coordinate distinct 
from the values or the derivatives of the polynomial ( )w x .  
Let us note, that the probability Paut of such an authorization of the 
authenticity of 1r +  shares from a finite field with ( )card F  elements, received 
by the combiner, is given by the formula  
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 ( )
11
1
r mautP
card F
−= − ⎡ ⎤ −⎣ ⎦
. 
On the other hand, the probability Prec of random recovering of the key K is 
equal to  
 ( )
1
mrecP
card F
= ⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦
. 
Now we present Algorithm 2, which computes the modified divided 
differences [ ] ( )  0,1,...,z k k r= . For this purpose, we assume that the shares 
 [ ] [ ] [ ] ( ),    ,       0,1,...,i i ik k i x x i y y i i r= = = =  
are given, and use an additional one dimensional array b to remember the 
divided differences  
 [ ] 1, ,..., ,    0,1,...,k k jb k y y y k j+= = , 
which are necessary in the loop with respect to 0,1,..,j r= .  
 
for(j = 0; j <= r; j++) 
{ 
   for(i = j; i >= j - k[j]; i--) 
         b[i] = y[2*j - k[j] - i]; 
   for(i = j - k[j] - 1; i >= 0; i--) 
        b[i] = (b[i+1]-b[i])/(x[j]-x[i]); 
   z[j] = b[0]; 
} 
Algorithm 2 
 
Next, in order to derive the key  
 ( ) [ ] [ ] ( ) [ ]0 0 1 10 0 1 ... 1 ...r rK w z z x z r x x x −= = − + + −  
one can use Horner algorithm, presented in Algorithm 3. 
 
K = z[r];  
for(i = r-1; i >= 0; i--) 
        K = z[i]-K*x[i]; 
Algorithm 3 
 
Example 1. Suppose that 37F Z=  is a field of integers modulo 37, and that the 
dealer D took the key 23K = , the polynomial  
 ( ) 3 2 23w x x x= + +  
knots of interpolation 
 0 1 2 3 411,    36x x x x x= = = = = , 
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and the integer 4r = . Next, suppose that he has applied Algorithm 1 to compute 
the coordinates 
 0 1 2 3 47,    32,    20,    5,    34y y y y y= = = = = , 
of the shares, and  distributed among members of secret sharing the following 
shares 
0 1 2 3 4(0,11,7),   (1,11,32),   (0,36,20),   (1,36,5),   (2,36,34)U U U U U= = = = = . 
In order to recover the key, we assume that the combiner C receives all these 
shares. Then he can use Algorithm 2 to compute the modified divided 
differences [ ]7,32,21,1,0z = . Hence he can notice that the last divided 
difference is equal to zero, which implies that the probability of authenticity of 
obtained shares is equal to 
 11 0.97233...
36aut
P = − = . 
Finally, he observes that 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )2 27 32 11 21 11 11 36w x x x x x= + − + − + − − , 
and uses Algorithm 3 to recover the key ( )0 23K w= =  with the same 
probability as above. 
 
3. The Neville method of recovering the secret 
If knots of interpolation 0 1, ,..., rx x x  are pairwise disjoint, then the key 
( )0K w=  can be derived from the well-known algorithm due to Neville [13]. 
It is interesting, that the same is true without any additional assumption. For this 
purpose, we define partial interpolating polynomials  
 ( ), ,    , 0,    j sp x j s j s r≥ + ≤ , 
of degree less or equal to s, which satisfy the following interpolating 
conditions 
 
( )( ), ,    , 1,...,
!
ji
j s i
i ki
i
p x
y i j j j s
j −
= = + +  (11) 
where the order of the derivative is defined by the formula 
 { }min ,i ij k i j= −  
Hence it follows directly that 
 ( ) ( ) ( ),0 0, 0,,    j j k r mjp y w x p x p x−= = =  
 
and 
 ( ) ( ),
0
s l
j s j k l j kj j
l
p x y x x− + −
=
= −∑ , 
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whenever j j sx x += , i.e. if j ss k +≤ . On the other hand, if sjj xx +≠ , then the 
following recurrent formula of the Neville type 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1, 1 , 1, 1, 1 j s j sj s j s j s
j s j
p x p x
p x p x x x
x x
+ − −
+ − +
+
−= + −− , 
is satisfied. Since the proof of this formula is similar to the proof of the classical 
interpolating formula of Neville [13], we omit the proof. Instead, we only note 
that, in view of the unicity of Hermite interpolation, it is sufficient to use 
induction to show that the right-hand side of the last formula satisfies the 
interpolating conditions (11). 
Now, if we have 0 j r≤ ≤ , then we denote 
 [ ] ( ), 0 ,    0,1,...,i j ib i p i j−= = , 
and conclude that 
 [ ] [ ] ( )1 2 ,    1, 2,...,j ij i k jjb i b i y j k i x i j j j k−−⎡ ⎤= + + − − − = − − −⎣ ⎦ , 
and 
 [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] j j11 ,    i  j k 1,j k 1,...,0j
j i
b i b i
b i b i x
x x
+ −= + − = − − − −− , 
where 
 [ ] jb j y j k⎡ ⎤= −⎣ ⎦  
Hence it follows directly that the combiner can apply Algorithm 4 to the data 
 [ ] [ ] [ ] ( ),    ,       0,1,...,i i ik k i x x i y y i i r= = = = , 
in order to get the key ( )0K w= , which is identical to the last value of [ ]0b . 
 
for(j = 0; j <= r; j++) 
 { 
     b[j] = y[j - k[j]];  d[j]=1; 
     for(i = j-1; i >= j - k[j]; i--) 
        { 
           d[i] = -d[i]*x[i]; 
           b[i] = b[i] + y[2*j-i-k[j]]*d[i]; 
        } 
        for(i = j - k[j] - 1; i >= 0; i--) 
           b[i] = b[i+1]-x[j]*(b[i+1]-b[i])/(x[j]-
x[i]); 
 } 
K = b[0]; 
Algorithm 4 
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Clearly, one can finish calculations in Algorithm 4 in the case, when 
1j m= + . This follows from the fact that value of [ ]0b , which is computed for 
j m= , remains unchanged in the next cycles of the loop for 
 1, 2,...,j m m r= + + , 
which is a simple consequence of the uniqueness of interpolation of Hermite 
type. However, this property is useful in verification of authenticity of received 
shares by the combiner. The probability of this verification is given by the 
 ( )
11
1
r mautP
card F
−= − ⎡ ⎤ −⎣ ⎦
. 
In order to illustrate the recovering of the key by Neville method, we can 
apply Algorithm 4 to the data from Example 1 and get the following vector 
 [ ]23,23,22,25,20b = , 
which implies again that 23K = . In this case, the probability of authenticity of 
received shares and the key is equality of the first two coordinates ( )0,4 0p  and 
( )1,3 0p  of vector b defined by 
 [ ] ( ),4 0 ,    0,1,...,4i ib i p i−= = . 
This probability is equal to 
 0.97233...autp =  
 
4. Increasing of the security of secret sharing 
The assumption n m≥  about the number 1n +  of participants of secret 
sharing and about the order m of polynomial ( )w x , can decrease drastically the 
degree of the polynomial, which simplifies the complexity of the problem of 
secret sharing and diminish its security. It seems to be a serious drawback. For 
example, if we admit only two participants ( )1n = , then the polynomial ( )w x  
has to be a linear function, which is not secure against attacks [9]. This problem 
can be overc0me if we assume, in the case when n m< , that the combiner C can 
receive at least m n−  additional shares from the dealer D, which together with 
remaining shares should satisfy conditions (10). Let us note, that this assumption 
makes the secret sharing democratic, since every 1r +  share, obtained from the 
participants of secret sharing, can be extended in an obvious way to 1r +?  share, 
which satisfies conditions (10) and inequality r m≥? . 
On the other hand, it seems to be hard to justify the possibility of 
communicating between the combiner and the dealer during recovering the 
secret. The reason is that such a communication can diminish significantly the 
security of the whole process. Therefore, the most interesting solution of the 
problem seems to be the model of secret sharing which admits the possibility of 
Pobrane z czasopisma Annales AI- Informatica http://ai.annales.umcs.pl
Data: 04/08/2020 21:51:40
UM
CS
Algorithms for multi-secret hierarchical sharing schemes … 75 
simultaneous distributing shares of the key ( )0K w= , computed by using of 
Algorithm 1, between the combiner and the participants. More precisely, the 
combiner should receive c shares of the form 
 ( ), , ,    0,1,.., 1i i i iU k x y i c= = − , 
and participants should get 1n c− +  shares 
 ( ), , ,    , 1,...,i i i iU k x y i c c n= = + , 
where 0 c m n≤ ≤ ≤ . Clearly, interpolating knots xi of multiplicity 1in m≤ +  
ought to satisfy the assumption 
 { } { }0 1 1 1, ,..., , ,...,c c c nx x x x x x− +∩ =∅ . 
The recovering of the key ( )0K w=  in this model is possible, if the combiner 
C will receive 1+− cr  shares 
 ( ), , ,    0,1,...,i i i j i jj jU k x y j r c= = −  (12) 
from 1n c− +  participants, where 
 m r n≤ ≤ , 0 1 ... r cc i i i n−≤ < < < ≤  (13) 
and 
 1 21,    2,...,    j j j j j k j ii jji i i i i i k− − −= − = − = − .(14) 
Without loss of generality, the combiner can simplify notations by setting  
 , 1,...,c c r+  instead of  0 1, ,..., r ci i i − , 
and next can recover the key ( )0K w=  by using Algorithms 2 and 3. 
void DivDif(int k[], FType x[],FType y[],FType z[], 
 FType b[], int c, int r) 
{ 
    for(int j = c; j <= r; j++) 
    { 
        b[j] = y[j-k[j]]; 
        for(int i = j - 1; i >= j - k[j]; i--) 
               b[i] = y[2*j - k[j] - i]; 
        for(int i = j - k[j] - 1; i >= 0; i--) 
              b[i] = (b[i+1]-b[i])/(x[j]-x[i]); 
       z[j] = b[0]; 
    } 
} 
Algorithm 5. The function DivDif 
 
It should be noted that the combiner C can use Algorithm 2 to compute the 
following modified divided differences 
 [ ] 0 1, ,..., kz k y y y=  and [ ] 1 1, ,..., ,    0,1,..., 1k k cb k y y y k c+ −= = − , 
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as soon as he receives his part of shares. Next he can use them during the 
recovering of several ( )0K w= . In order to do this, it is convenient to rewrite 
Algorithm 2 as a function DivDif, where the type FType is defined in the 
same way as in Algorithm 1 from Section 2.  
Now, we can call twice the functions  
 DivDif(x,y,z,b,0,c-1); 
 DivDif(x,y,z,b,c,r); 
and apply Algorithm 3 to get the key  ( )0K w= . 
In our model of secret sharing, it is convenient to use Neville algorithm, 
written as a function called Neville. 
 
void Neville(int k[],FType x[],FType y[],FType d[],  
FType b[], int c, int r, FType K) 
{  
   FType d* = new FType[r+1]; 
   for(int j = c; j <= r; j++) 
   { 
        b[j] = y[j-k[j]];d[j]=1; 
        for (int i = j-1; i >= j - k[j]; i--) 
   { 
            d[i] = -d[i]*x[i] ; 
            b[i] = b[i] + y[j+j-i-k[j]]*d[i]; 
        } 
        for (int i = j - k[j] - 1; i >= 0; i--) 
            b[i] = b[i+1]-(b[i+1]-b[i])*x[j]/(x[j]-
x[i]); 
    } 
    K = b[0]; 
} 
Algorithm 6. The function Neville 
 
In this case, we can call twice the functions 
 Nevil(k,x,y,d,b,0,c-1,K); 
 Nevil(k,x,y,d,b,c,r,K); 
to get the key [ ]0K b= . 
Note that the last model of secret sharing can not be programmed effectively, 
whenever one wants to use the Lagrange interpolating formula instead of the 
formulae of Newton or Neville. This is true even in the case, when 
 0ik = ,   0,1,...,i n= , 
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which was considered by Shamir [1]. It follows directly from the fact that the 
Lagrange interpolating formula is not useful to apply the previous results in 
order to prolong computations for additional shares. 
 
Example 2. Let us suppose that the dealer D chooses the key 87614083K Z= ∈ , 
and next takes 13n r= =  and the polynomial 
 ( ) 11 9 6 3205 89 503 1223 341 4803w x x x x x x= + + + + + . 
Moreover, let us suppose that the knots of interpolation are equal to 
 0 1 6 7 8 10 11 12 13... 523, ... 2365,    6543x x x x x x x x x= = = = = = = = = = = . 
After computing via Algorithm 1 of the following values  
 
( ) ( )( ) 0 13
!
ik
i
i
i
w x
y i
k
= ≤ ≤ , 
the dealer distributes 7c =  and 1 7n c− + =  shares between the combiner and 
participants of secret sharing, respectively. Then the combiner can use his shares 
to compute by Algorithm 5 the following initial divided diference 
 [ ]7993,5082,3667,2417,420,721, 468z =  
and  
 [ ]7993,5082,3667,2417,420,721,468b = , 
in the case of the Newton method. In the case of the Neville method, he can 
apply Algorithm 6 to get the values  
 [ ]5185,1391,2579,1193,6165,4690,7993b =  
of partial interpolating polynomials. Consequently, he gathers the remaining 
shares distributed among the participants and calls the function  
 DivDif(x,y,z,b,7,13); 
or 
 Neville(k,x,y,d,b,7,13,K); 
in order to get the polynomial 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( )
2 3
4 5 5
5 4 5 2
5 3 5 4
5
6173 4438 523 7317 523 4191 523
        228 523 1439 523 4701 523 2365
        2639 523 2365 1688 523 2365
        3461 523 2365 5336 523 2365 6543
        205 523 2
w x x x x
x x x x
x x x x
x x x x x
x x
= + − + − + −
+ − + − + − −
+ − − + − −
+ − − + − − −
+ − −( ) ( )4 2365 6543 ,x −
 
or the vector 
[ ]4803,4803,4803,4748,4258,1290,3006,4507,2439,848,5257,5160,2293,6173b =
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of values of partial interpolating polynomials. Hence the recovered key is equal 
to  
 ( )0 4803K w= = , 
or 
 [ ] [ ] [ ]0 1 2 4803K b b b= = = = . 
In this case, the probability of authenticity of shares is identical to  
 2
11 0.999999987...
8761 1aut
P = − =− . 
 
5. Secret sharing with polynomial keys 
In the previous sections, we encountered the situation that the dealer D chose 
randomly coefficient of the polynomial 
 ( )
0
,    m n
m
m k
k
k
w x a x −
=
= ≤∑  
distributed c shares  
 ( ), , ,    0,1,.., 1i i i iU k x y i c= = − , 
to the combiner and 1n c− +  shares 
 ( ), , ,    , 1,...,i i i iU k x y i c c n= = + , 
to the remaining participants where 0 c m n≤ ≤ ≤  and 
{ } { }0 1 1 1, ,..., , ,...,c c c nx x x x x x− +∩ =∅ . 
In each of these models, the role of the dealer started with the choice of the key 
mK a=  and ended with the distribution of. 
This choice of the key can be modified in such a way that it ought to reflect 
the structure of the problem to a greater extent and to be more complicated. 
More precisely, we now consider the keys of the form 
 
0 1
...
si i i
K a a a= , 
where 0 10 ... si i i m= < < < ≤  and 0 1, ,..., si i ia a a  are the coefficient of the 
polynomial ( )w x , which are different from zero. The keys of this form are said 
to be polynomial keys. An example of such a, which corresponds to the 
polynomial   
 ( ) 12345 12243 293 769 20 9071w x x x x= + + + , 
has the form 
 93769209071K = . 
It is clear that this definition could be modified in such a way that the key 
includes also the coefficients equal to zero. In other words, we could set 
 0 1... mK a a a= , 
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at least in the case, when the degree m of the polynomial ( )w x  is not too large. 
Furthermore, it is also possible to take as a key an arbitrary subset of different 
from zero coefficients of ( )w x  In the following, for the simplicity of our 
consideration, we will usually assume that polynomial keys do not include a 
coefficient equal to zero.  
In the same way as in the previous section, the recovering of a polynomial 
key requires from the combiner C computing the modified divided differences  
 0 1, ,..., ,    0,1,..., 1, , 1,...,k kz y y y k c c c r= = − + , 
in two steps. He should begin the first step after receiving 1r c− +  shares of the 
form 
 ( ), , ,    0,1,...,j jj ji i i iU k x y j r c= = −  
which should satisfy conditions (13) and (14). Let us recall that these conditions 
are characteristic of the interpolation of Hermite type. At the beginning of the 
second step, the combiner should simplify the notation by setting  
 ( ), , ,    , 1,...,j j j jU k x y j c c r= = + . 
Next, he should verify the authenticity of received shares by checking, whether 
it is true that  
 1 2 ... 0m m rz z z+ += = = . 
Since the unicity of interpolation implies that the identity  
 ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )0 1 0 0 1 1... ...m mw x z z x x z x x x x x x −≡ + − + + − − − , 
holds, it follows that the combiner C can recover the polynomial key by setting  
 
0 1 0 1
... ,    ...
si i i s
K a a a i i i= < < < , 
where 
0 1
, ,...,
si i i
a a a  include all nonzero coefficients defined by formulae  
 
( ) ( )
( )
0
,    0,1,...,
!
m j
j
w
a j m
m j
−
= =− . 
Further, the key  
 0 1... mK a a a=  
includes all such coefficients. In order to get an algorithm of computing of 
coefficients aj of the polynomial ( )w x  represented in the Newton form, we need 
only to derive formulae for remainder c0 and coefficients 1 2, ,..., mc c c  of the 
quotient 
 ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )1 2 0 0 1 2... ...m mq x c c x x c x x x x x x −= + − + + − − − , 
which is obtained during the division 
 ( ) ( ) ( )0w x c x q xα= + −  
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of the polynomial ( )w x  by the binomial x α− . By setting 1 0mc + = , one can 
rewrite the right-hand side of this formula in the form  
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )
( ) ( )( ) ( )
0 0 0 0 1 2
1
1 0 1 1
0
...
        ... .
m
k k
k
m
k k k k
k
w x c x x x c x x x x x x
c x c x x x x x x
α
α
−
=
+ −
=
⎡ ⎤≡ + − + − − − −⎣ ⎦
⎡ ⎤≡ − + − − −⎣ ⎦
∑
∑
 
If we compare coefficients on both sides of this identity, we derive the following 
recurrent formulae  
 ( )1 ,    , 1,...,0k k k kc z c x k m mα+= − − = − , 
where 1 0mc + = . Now one can follow the proof of getting the extended Horner 
algorithm in order to establish Algorithm 7 of recovering the polynomial key K.  
 
void InverseHorner(float FType x[],float FType 
z[],float FType a[], int m) 
{ 
   for(int j = 0; j<=m; j++) 
   { 
      for(int i = m-1; i>=j; i--) 
          z[i] = z[i]-x[i-j] *z[i+1]; 
      a[m-j] = z[j]; 
   } 
} 
Algorithm 7. The function InverseHorner 
 
Finally, let us note that the process of generating one of the keys  
 
0 1
...
si i i
K a a a=  
or 
 0 1... mK a a a=  
in the field { }0,1,..., 1bZ b= −  of integers modulo a prime b, can be started from 
a random choice of a large positive integer k  such that the number of digits  
 ,    0,1,...,j ba Z j m∈ = , 
of its representation in the system with base b, or equivalently the number of 
coefficients of the polynomial expansion  
0
m
m j
j
j
k a b −
=
=∑ ,is less than ( ) 1bcard Z − . Clearly, the digits of k  are printed by 
the function generator, which is stated below.  
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void generator(unsigned int n, unsigned int b) 
{ 
if(n>0){ 
generator(n/b, b); 
     cout<<n%b; 
} 
} 
 
Example 3. Suppose that 75437F Z= , 4943n = , 4943r = , 4938c = , and  
 ( ) 4940 4939205 623 603 6097w x x x x= + + + . 
Then the polynomial key is equal to  
 2056236036097K = . 
If we suppose that the values  
 ( ) ( )  0 4937i iy w x i= ≤ ≤  
of polynomial ( )w x  at the points 5ix i= +  were received by the combiner, and 
if the shares  
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
4938 4939 4940
4941 4942 4943
0,5634,64704 ,  1,5634,57195 ,  2,5634,28201 ,
0,6569,42554 ,  1,6569,10102 ,  2,6569,25712 ,
U U U
U U U
= = =
= = =  
were obtained by the participants, then in order to recover the key it is necessary 
to compute first the following  divided differences  
 [ ] 0 ,..., ,    0,1,...,4943iz i y y i= = , 
by using Algorithm 5. Consequently, one can apply Algorithm 7  to derive the 
nonzero coefficients  
[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]0 205,    1 623,    4939 603,    4940 6097a a a a= = = =  
of expansion with respect to the polynomial basis of the modified Newton 
interpolating polynomial defined by the divided differences z[i]. The probability 
that the shares are authentic is now equal to   
 3
11 0.99999999999999767...
75437 1aut
P = − =−  . 
 
6. Orthogonal polynomial keys  
In the last model of secret sharing with a polynomial key, one can replace the 
following two bases  
 1, ,..., mx x  
and 
 ( )( ) ( )0 0 1 11, ,..., ... mx x x x x x x x −− − − −  
with the arbitrary two bases  
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 ( ) ( ) ( )0 1, ,..., mp x p x p x  and ( ) ( ) ( )0 1, ,..., mg x g x g x  
in the space of polynomials of degree less or equal to m. Next, one can choose 
randomly the key  
 0 1... mK a a a=  
and set  
 ( ) ( )
0
m
k k
k
w x a p x
=
=∑ , 
where we may additionally assume that the coefficients equal to zero are omitted 
in the definition of the key K. For the simplicity of notation, we will ignore this 
assumption in the following. If two polynomial bases are fixed, then the dealer 
has to distribute the shares of the form  
 0 0 1 1 1 1,    ,..., c cU b U b U b− −= = =  and 1 1,    ,...,c c c c m mU b U b U b+ += = =  
between the combiner and the remaining participants, where 0b , 1,...,b  mb  are 
equal to the coefficients of the expansion of the polynomial ( )w x  with respect 
to the basis ( ) ( ) ( )0 1, ,..., mg x g x g x , i.e.  
 ( ) ( )
0
m
k k
k
w x b g x
=
=∑ . (15) 
Computation of these coefficients requires knowledge of an efficient 
algorithm to pass from the basis  
 ( ) ( ) ( )0 1, ,..., mp x p x p x  
to the basis  
 ( ) ( ) ( )0 1, ,..., mg x g x g x  
Furthermore, if the combiner receives the shares K  
 1 1,    ,...,c c c c m mU b U b U b+ += = = , 
then he needs an inverse algorithm to recover the key K.  
In particular, one can obtain an interesting class of models, when we set  
 0 1... mK a a a= , 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )0 1 0 0 1 11,    ,..., ...m mg x g x x x g x x x x x x x −= = − = − − −  
and 
 ( ) ( )
0
m
k k
k
w x a p x
=
=∑ , (16) 
where it is assumed that 0 c m r n≤ ≤ ≤ ≤ , that the knots { }\ 0ix F∈  
( )0,1,..,i n=  satisfy the same conditions as in Section 2, and that the 
polynomials ( )kp x  are defined by the following recurrent formulae  
 ( ) ( )0 1 11,    p x p x x u= = −  
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 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1 2 ,    2,3,... ,k k k k kp x x u p x v p x k m− −= − − = , 
with some fixed parameters ,k ku v F∈ . Let us note that in the particular case, 
when F is the field of real numbers and if all coefficients kν  are positive, the 
monic polynomials  
 ( ) ( ) ( )0 1, ,..., mp x p x p x  
are orthogonal with respect to some weight function. In view of this fact, the last 
key K is said to be an orthogonal key.  
Since the basis ( ) ( ) ( )0 1, ,..., mg x g x g x  is the same as in the Newton formula 
for interpolation of Hermite type, it follows that, without loss of generality, we 
can restrict our attention to the case, when the combiner C owns c shares and 
receives 1r c− +  additional shares from the participants of secret sharing. 
Moreover, we assume that all this shares have the same form as in previous 
sections, i.e. that  
 ( ), , ,    0,1,..., 1, ,...,j j j jU k x y j c c r= = − . 
In order to establish efficient algorithms to change such bases, we put  
 ( ) ( )( )m jj k k j
k j
w x a p x−
=
=∑  (17) 
and 
 ( ) ( )( 1)1 1
1
m
j
j k k j
k j
w x a p x++ − −
= +
= ∑  (18) 
into the recurrent formula  
 ( ) ( ) ( )( 1) 1 ,    0jj j i jw x a x x w x j m+ += + − ≤ ≤ , 
for the division of the polynomial ( )jw x  by the binomial ix x− , where ( )1jja +  
denotes the remainder and ( )1jw x+  the quotient of this division. Consequently, 
one can use the recurrent formulae for the polynomials ( )k jp x−  to get  
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( 1) ( 1)
1
1
( 1) ( 1)
1 2
1
( 1) ( 1) ( 1)
1 1 2 2 ,
m m
j j j
k k j j k k j k j i k j
k j k j
m
j j
j k k j k j i k j k j k j
k j
m
j j j
k k j i k k j k k j
k j
a p x a a x u u x p x
a a p x u x p x v p x
a u x a v a p x
+ +
− − − − −
= = +
+ +
− − − − − − −
= +
+ + +
+ − + + − + −
=
⎡ ⎤= + − + −⎣ ⎦
⎡ ⎤= + + − +⎣ ⎦
⎡ ⎤= + − +⎣ ⎦
∑ ∑
∑
∑
 
where 0 j m≤ ≤  and ( 1) ( 1)1 2 0j jm ma a+ ++ += = . 
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Now we compare the coefficients at these polynomials to get the following 
recurrent formulae  
 ( )
( 1) ( ) ( 1) ( ) ( 1)
1 1
( 1) ( ) ( 1) ( 1)
1 1 2 2
, ( ) ,
,    2, 3,..., ,
j j j j j
m m m m m i m
j j j j
k k k i k k k
a a a a u x a
a a u x a v a k m m j
+ + +
− −
+ + +
+ + + +
= = − −
= − − − = − −  
which can be used to compute shares  
 
( )( )0 ( 1) ,    0,1,..., 1
!
j
i j
j
w x
a j m
j
+= = − , 
for the polynomial  
 ( ) ( ) ( )(0)0
0
:
m
k k
k
w x a p x w x
=
= =∑ . 
It should be noticed, that these recurrent formulae generalize the well-known 
Clenshaw recurrent formulae [13] for computation of values ( )0 iw x  of the 
polynomial ( ) ( )0w x w x=  at the point ix x= . In the function Clenshaw, they 
are applied to derive 
 
void Clenshaw(FType a[], int m, FType x[], int n, 
FType u[], 
         FType v[],FType y[]) 
{ 
FType * b = new FType [m+1]; 
     int i = 0, ni; 
     FType xi; 
     while(i<=n) 
     { 
       for(int j = 0; j<=m; j++) 
          b[j] = a[j]; 
       ni = 0; xi = x[i]; 
       while(i<=n && x[i]==xi) 
       { 
           b[m-1] = b[m-1]-(u[m-ni] -x[i])*b[m]; 
           for(int k=m-2;k>=ni;k--) 
               b[k]=b[k]-(u[k+1-ni]-x[i])*b[k+1]-
v[k+2-ni]*b[k+2]; 
       } 
       y[i]= b[ni]; 
       ni++; i++; 
    } 
} 
Algorithm 8. The function Clenshaw 
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the following coordinates  
 
( )( )
!
ik
i
i
i
w x
y
k
=  
of shares  
 ( ), , ,    0,1,..,i i i iU k x y i n= =  
where  
 ( ) ( )
0
,    m n
m
k k
k
w x a p x
=
= ≤∑ , 
is the polynomial, which corresponds to the orthogonal polynomial key  
 0 1... mK a a a= . 
As in Section 1, we assume that knots of interpolation satisfy conditions (1) 
and that ki denotes the left-hand side multiplicity of the knot xi. 
Recovering of the orthogonal polynomial key K  can be organized as follows. 
At the beginning, it  is necessary to use Algorithm 2 in order to compute the 
modified divided differences  
 0 1, ,..., ,    0k kb y y y k m= ≤ ≤ . 
Next, by applying Algorithm 9, which is based on formula (15) , it remains to 
compute the vector a starting from the following values  
 0 0 1 1,    ,..., m ma b a b a b= = = . 
 
void InverseClenshaw(FType a[],int n, FType x[],int m,  
                     Ftype u[],Ftype v[]) 
{ 
for(int j = m-1; j>=0; j--) 
{ 
     for(int k = j; k <= m - 2; k++) 
            a[k]=a[k]+(u[k+1-j]-x[j])*a[k+1]+v[k+2-
j]*a[k+2]; 
          a[m-1] = a[m-1]+(u[m-j] -x[j])*a[m]; 
     } 
} 
Algorithm 9. The function InverseClenshaw 
 
Example 4. Suppose that 2341F Z= , 11n = , 10m =  and these polynomials  
 
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
0 1
1 2
1,    ,
4 ,    2,3,...,10,i i i
p x p x x
p x xp x p x i− −
= =
= − =  
are the monic Chebyshev polynomials of the first kind. If the dealer selects the 
polynomial  
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 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )0 1 4 7 10123 205 10 132 456w x p x p x p x p x p x= + + + +  
then the orthogonal key can be equal to  
 12320500100013200456K = , 
or equivalently to  
 12320510132456K = . 
Further, suppose that the dealer used Algorithm 8 to compute the shares  
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
0 1 2 3
4 5 6 7
8 9 10 11
0,17,234 ,   1,18,2224 ,   2,18,199 ,   0,23,1252 ,
1,23,1039 ,   2,23,389 ,   0,46,1472 ,   1,46,1103 ,
2,46,865 ,   0,111,181 ,   1,111,1295 ,   0,144,1668 ,
U U U U
U U U U
U U U U
= = = =
= = = =
= = = =
 
which were given to participants of secret sharing, and perhaps to the combiner. 
Then the recovering of the key K requires of using Algorithm 9 to at least 10 
shares, e.g. to shares 0 1 9, ,...,U U U . This algorithm yields the following vector  
 [ ]123,205,0,0,10,0,0,132,0,0,456a = ,  
with nonzero coordinates identical to the orthogonal key K.  
Finally, let us note that the execution of Algorithm 2 to compute starting 
values of vector a for all eleven shares, and the calling of the function  
 InverseClenshaw(a,11,x,11,u,v); 
yield vector a of the form  
 [ ]123,205,0,0,10,0,0,132,0,0,456,0a = . 
The last coordinate of this vector is equal to zero, which proves the authenticity 
of received shares and recovered key with the probability  
11 0.9996...
2340aut
P = − =  
 7. Fast Fourier transform in secret sharing 
In this section, we consider the case when the dealer fixed the polynomial 
 ( ) 1
0
n
j
j
j
w x a x
−
=
=∑  
and chose the key  
 0 1 1... nK a a a −=  
or 
 ( ) 00K w a= =  
in a commutable ring ( ), ,F F= + ⋅ , which has a primitive ω of degree 2kn =  
( )1k ≥  from the unity. Let us recall that ω should satisfy [1] conditions: 1ω ≠ , 
1nω =  and 
 
1
0
0,    1
n
pj
j
p nω
−
=
= ≤ <∑ . 
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Moreover, it will be assumed that the combiner recovers the key K from shares 
of the form ( ), ,    0,1,.., 1i iU i y i n= = − , 
where yi denote the values of polynomial ( )w x  at the roots iω  of degree n rom 
the unity, i.e.  
 
1
0
,    0
n
ij
i j
j
y a i nω
−
=
= ≤ <∑ . (19) 
The last equations define the discrete Fourier transform of the cartesian product  
Fn into itself. If we additionally assume that the element n has an inverse in the 
ring F [15], then the unique solution of the system (19) is given by the formulae 
 
1 1
( )
0 0
1 1 ,    0
n n
ij n i j
i j j
j j
a y y i n
n n
ω ω
− −
− −
= =
= = ≤ <∑ ∑ , (20) 
which define the inverse discrete Fourier transform. It is clear that to the 
computation of the Fourier and inverse Fourier transforms one can apply n times 
Horner algorithm for the points  
 2 11, , ,... nω ω ω − , 
which requires ( )2O n  algebraic operations. Let us note, that the order of the 
number of algebraic operations for the algorithms of Newton and Neville is the 
same. 
One can essentially decrease this order to ( )2logO n n , whenever we apply 
the FFT-algorithm (the fast Fourier transform algorithm) for computations of 
both the Fourier and inverse Fourier transforms. In the proceeding, we present 
the simplest derivation of this algorithm. More precisely, its recursive version 
will be given, which is modeled on the famous algorithm of quick sorting 
presented in the monograph [16]. For this purpose, we need to compute the 
remainders  
 ( ) 1, 1
0
m
j
l l m j
j
r x c x
−
+ −
=
=∑  and  ( ) 1,
0
m
j
l m p j
j
r x d x
−
+
=
=∑  
obtained from the division of the previous remainder  
 ( ) 2 1,
0
1,    
2
m
j
l p j
j
p lr x b x m
−
=
− += =∑  
by polynomials  
 ( ) ( )1 [ ] [ / ], 1 l m r j m r l ml l m
j l
g x x xω ω
+ −
+ −
=
= − = −∏ , 
and  
 ( ) ( )[ ] [ / ], p r j m r l ml m p
j l m
g x x xω ω+
= +
= − = +∏ , 
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where 0 1l p n≤ ≤ ≤ − , coefficients bj of the starting remainder ( )0, 1nr x−  are 
equal to the coefficients aj of the Fourier transform to be computed, the integers 
l, m and l/m are either nonnegative powers of 2 or are equal to zero, and the 
coordinates of sequence [ ] [ ] [ ]0 , 1 ,.., 1r r r n −  have k-digit binary representations 
of the form  
 [ ] 1 2 0 2, , ,...,k kr j j j j− −= , 
which are derived from the reflection of the following k-digit binary 
representations  
 0 1 1 2, , ,..., kj j j j= , 
In the following inductive proofs of the simplified formulae for divisors,  
 
( ) ( ) ( )
( )
, , 1 ,
1 [ / ] [1 / ] [ / ] [1 / ]
1 [ /( 1)]
           
           ,
l p l l m l m p
p l r l m r l m m r l m r l m
p l r l p l
g x g x g x
x x
x
ω ω ω ω
ω
+ − +
− + + +
− + − +
=
= − + +
= −
 
we apply the identities  
 
1 [ /( 1))[1 / ] / 2 [ / ] [ / ] 2
r l p lr l m n r l m r l mω ω ω ω ω − ++ = = − = − , 
and formulae for the coefficients cj we derive similarly as in the previous 
section: 
 
( )
( )
2 1 1 1
1 [ / ]
0 0 0
1 1
[ / ] 1
0 0
,
m m m
j m r l m j j
j j j
j j j
m m
r l m j j m
j j j
j j
b x x t x c x
c t x t x
ω
ω
− − −
−
= = =
− −
+ −
= =
= − +
= − +
∑ ∑ ∑
∑ ∑
 
whence 
 [ / ] ,    0,1,.., 1r l mj j jc b t j mω= + = − . 
Since the formulae for coefficients dj are similar, it follows eventually that the 
recursive function of fast computing the Fourier transform for the data 
 [ ] ja j a=   and  [ ] [ ] ,    0 1r jx j j nω= ≤ ≤ − , 
can be stated as in Algorithm 10. 
This algorithm yields permuted coordinates a 
 [ ] [ ]( ) ,    0,1,..., 1a j w x j j n= = − . 
of vector a. In other words, the coordinates of shares ( ),i iU i y= , computed by 
the dealer, are equal to 
 [ ] ,    0,1,..., 1jy a r j j n⎡ ⎤= = −⎣ ⎦ . 
 
void Fourie(FType a[],int l, int p, FType x[]) 
{ 
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    int m; 
    FType z, w; 
    m = (p-l+1)/2; 
    z = x[l/m]; 
    for (int j=l; j<l+m; j++) 
    { 
        w = a[j]+z*a[j+m]; 
        a[j+m] = a[j]-z*a[jam]; 
        a[j] = w; 
    } 
    if (m>l) 
        Fourier(a,l,m+l-1,x); 
        Fourier(a,m+l,p,x); 
} 
Algorithm 10. The function Fourier 
 
Note that the call of this function of the form 
 Fourier(a,0,n-1,x); 
will force its next 2logk n=  consequent calls. Hence the cost of the fast Fourier 
transform is equal to  
( )2 22 log logn n O n n=  
of algebraic operations from the ring F. Clearly, the reduction of algebraic 
operations in the FFT algorithm increases considerably with the increase of n.  
Since recovering of the key K can be based on the inverse Fourier transform, 
it follows from the second formula given in (20) that the following function call  
 Fourier(a,0,n-1,x); 
for the vectors 
 [ ] [ ] [ ]0 1 11 1 10 ,    1 ,...,    1 na y a y a n yn n n −= = − =  
and 
 [ ] [ ] ,    0 1r n jx j j nω −= ≤ ≤ − , 
transforms the vector a in such a way that the final values  
[ ] [ ]( ) ,    0 1a j w x n j j n= − ≤ ≤ −  
recover the key  
[ ] [ ] [ ]1 ... 1K a r n a r n a r⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤= −⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦ . 
 
Example 5. Let 32 8n = = , 17F Z= , 2ω = , and  
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 ( ) 2 6 71 3 2w x x x x= + + + . 
Then 1 15n− =  and the key K and values ( )0 7ix i≤ <  are identical to  
 10300012K =  
and 
 
0 4 2 6
0 1 2 3
1 5 3 7
4 5 6 7
1,    16,    4,    13,
2,    15,    8,    9.
x x x x
x x x x
ω ω ω ω
ω ω ω ω
= = = = = = = =
= = = = = = = =  
By using the function Fourier we get 
 0 1 2 3
4 5 6 7
(1) 7,    (16) 3,    (4) 6,    (13) 5,
(2) 10,    (15) 8,    (8) 6,    (9) 14,
w a w a w a w a
w a w a w a w a
= = = = = = = =
= = = = = = = =  
whence 0 1 2 3
4 5 6 7
(0,7),    (1,10),     (2,6),    (3,6),
(4,3),    (5,8),    (6,5),    (7,14).
U U U U
U U U U
= = = =
= = = =  
If  the combiner C  receives these shares from the participants, he uses formulae 
(20) to computes  
 [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]0 3,  1 14,  2 5,  3 5,  4 11,  5 1,  6 7,  7 6a a a a a a a a= = = = = = = = , 
and performs a function call of the form  
 Fourier(a,0,7,x); 
in order to get the new values of coordinates of vector a . Finally, he puts  
 [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]0 7 3 5 1 6 2 4 10300012K a a a a a a a a= = . 
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